In this study, we employ the EDGAR download database to show that information acquisition of accounting reports on EDGAR is predictive of future firm performance (measured by both returns and accounting fundamentals). We then add a novel feature to the dataset that captures the identity of EDGAR users and designate users as sophisticated institutional investors (e.g., hedge funds, investment banks) or as less sophisticated non-institutional investors (e.g., retail investors). We predict and find that the information acquisition activities of more sophisticated, institutional users are more highly associated with future abnormal returns than are those of less sophisticated users. We next explore potential reasons for the predictive power of some users' information acquisition. We find that sophisticated users gather information on firms whose information signals are costlier to interpret and that are harder to value than those of firms targeted by less sophisticated, non-institutional investors. In summary, this study provides evidence that investor actions to become informed are themselves informative for future firm performance.
Introduction
We investigate whether investors' information acquisition choices for accounting information are themselves informative, in the sense that they reveal information about expected future performance. In the presence of information costs, agents will engage in costly information acquisition to the extent that the perceived benefits of the information exceed the expected costs of acquiring and processing the information (Grossman and Stiglitz 1980) . Thus, in theory, if one could observe investors' information acquisition, they could infer something about the expected net benefits of the information acquired. In this study, we use novel data that capture investor actions to gather accounting information about firms and test whether these actions predict future firm stock returns and fundamentals.
Our primary tests are motivated by the revealed preferences theory introduced by Samuelson (1938) , in that we use investors' decisions to acquire information about firms to "reverse engineer" their expectations about future net payoffs from information acquisition. Our approach is similar to that deployed in recent research in financial economics that uses a revealed preferences approach to infer the underlying asset pricing model used by investors (Berk and van Binsbergen, 2016) , investor risk preferences (Barber, Huang and Odean, 2016) , or equity analysts' expectations of future firm performance (Lee and So, 2016) . The intuition in these studies is there is latent information in market participants' revealed actions-by studying their actions, one can uncover that latent information. We apply this approach to an accounting setting to test whether accounting information acquisition choices reveal information about investor expectations of future net payoffs.
Large-scale empirical evidence for the idea that information acquisition should predict future information signals is relatively rare in the literature. This lack of evidence likely stems from the fact that measures of investors' information acquisition are only now becoming search data with IP address ownership information to separate the information acquisition activities of two classes of investors: more sophisticated, institutional EDGAR users (e.g., investment banks, hedge funds, etc.) and less sophisticated, retail EDGAR users. Our data allow us to observe a portion of the information acquisition activities of important institutions, such as Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Citadel, and Maverick Capital, which we can then compare to the activities of non-institutional users, such as retail investors accessing financial information online via their Comcast or Time Warner internet account. This allows us to test whether some users' accounting information acquisition is relatively more informative than others at predicting future firm performance. Moreover, an advantage of using EDGAR download data is that differences in their predictive ability cannot be driven by differences in acquisition costs because the EDGAR database is freely available to all investors.
2 Therefore, differences in information acquisition activities should reflect users' differential ex ante expectations for payoffs and their ability to process information.
Our results suggest that the revealed preferences of less sophisticated EDGAR users reveal very little (essentially nothing) about future firm performance, suggesting that their expected payoffs do not match their information acquisition choices. If anything, the information acquisition activities of less sophisticated users are negatively related to some future performance metrics. In contrast, we find that the information acquisition actions of sophisticated users are highly predictive of future abnormal returns and firm fundamentals. Specifically, we find a positive association between future annual abnormal returns and the information 2 Berk and van Binsbergen (2016) argue that the key to testing revealed preferences is to find an asset whose price is fixed, and thus market equilibration occurs through differences in quantities (or volume). Our setting fits this imperative, as the acquisition price for information from EDGAR is effectively zero; thus, if people are gathering more information about a firm via EDGAR (i.e., volume increases), it suggests that the expected payoffs to this information are also increasing.
acquisition activities of sophisticated investors, such that the spread in abnormal returns between firms in the highest and lowest quintile of sophisticated ESV is 8.4% annualized. 3 We observe a similar positive association between sophisticated ESV and future fundamentals, including future operating cash flows, ROE, and profit margins, and the magnitudes are significant in both statistical and economic terms. These results are consistent with sophisticated investors possessing a significant informational advantage over retail investors. In sum, accounting information acquisition for the "smart money" is exceptionally informative for future firm performance.
In our final tests, we examine the determinants of sophisticated information acquisition in an effort to better understand on how institutional investors gain their informational advantage.
While we cannot precisely quantify the costs of acquiring and learning from accounting reports, there are firms with certain fundamental signals and characteristics that are arguably more likely to be mispriced by the market because their information is more difficult to process and interpret than others. We expect that because institutional investors have the time, experience, training, and technology to process costly information, their information acquisition activities will reveal a preference for firms with more extreme past fundamentals, greater levels of intangibles, and higher valuation uncertainty. We further expect that sophisticated investors will show a lack of interest in household name, familiar securities that tend to have strong information environments and, as such, tend to be less mispriced.
Our findings support these expectations. Specifically, we find that sophisticated ESV is associated with firms that have more extreme, past fundamental signals with a particular preference for firms with extreme book-to-market ratios, market caps, unexpected earnings, and operating cash flows. We also find that sophisticated ESV is positively associated with the importance of intangibles assets and with two measures of valuation uncertainty, including return volatility and accounting losses. Finally, we find that sophisticated ESV is negatively associated with one of our proxies for firm familiarity, advertising intensity, and is not associated with membership in the S&P 500 or being in the retail industry. These results suggest that sophisticated investors gain an informational advantage by focusing their information collection efforts on firms whose past signals suggest they are harder to value and more likely to be mispriced and by not focusing on firms that are familiar to most investors.
This study contributes directly to the literature on accounting information acquisition, which tends to be long on theory and short on empirics. For example, Veldkamp (2011) surveys the large body of analytical research on information choices and laments the inability to empirically measure information acquisition. Only recently have researchers developed more direct measures of investor information acquisition to examine how these activities impact capital markets (e.g., Da et al. 2011; Drake et al. 2012; Lawrence et al. 2016) . These studies are important because they shed some light on how investors become informed. Our study advances this literature by introducing a dataset that allows us to: 1) observe accounting information acquisition actions; 2) separate the actions of more sophisticated users from those of less sophisticated users; and 3) demonstrate the predictive ability of accounting information gathering for future firm performance.
Our paper demonstrates that investors' actions to acquire accounting information are informative, holding constant the information itself. In this way, our paper contributes to the recent literature that examines the information content of market participants' actions, such as 6 investors' trades or holdings or analysts' coverage decisions, for predicting firm performance.
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Embedded in these studies is the assumption that these skilled market participants are able to garner an informational advantage over other investors-our novel data separating sophisticated from retail ESV allow us to test this assumption. The results suggest that sophisticated information acquisition of accounting information is related to future firm performance, and that their informational advantage derives from their engaging in costly information gathering and processing. In a stylized sense, our study provides simple and novel evidence of the GrossmanStiglitz paradox, which implies that investors will not engage in costly information acquisition unless there are ex ante expectations of returns by doing so. Our results are consistent with sophisticated investors profiting from costly information acquisition of accounting information.
Prior research and hypothesis development
Asset pricing theory asserts that if security prices are sufficiently noisy, then investors will be incentivized to engage in costly information acquisition (see Grossman and Stiglitz 1980; Diamond and Verrecchia 1981; Verrecchia 1982; Glosten and Milgrom 1985) . As discussed in Lee (2001) , prices converge to fundamental value as investors incur costs by expending time and resources to acquire, process, and trade on fundamental information. However, all investors are time-and resource-constrained and must decide how to allocate their time and attention to these activities. EDGAR search data provides an interesting setting for examining factors associated 4 For example, studies have examined the informed trading of hedge funds (Griffin and Xu, 2009; Agarwal, Jiang, Tang and Yang, 2013) , mutual funds (Daniel et al., 1997; Wermers, Yao and Zhao, 2012; Agarwal, Mullally, Tang and Yang 2015) , and institutional investors (Gompers and Metrick 2001; Bushee and Goodman 2007) , as well as the coverage decisions of analysts (Lee and So 2016) . Li and Sun (2017) provide evidence based on EDGAR usagewe discuss our contribution relative to this paper in Section 6.
with the decision to gather financial information about a particular firm and whether this activity contains information about expected investment payoffs.
Our first prediction relates to whether there is information about expected investment payoffs embedded in investors' information gathering activities. Basic economic intuition
suggests that investors will engage in information acquisition only for those firms where the payoffs from their acquisition and processing efforts will, in expectation, be higher than the associated costs. This suggests that investor information acquisition for a particular firm will contain useful information about the future performance of the firm.
A simple analogy illustrates our rationale: if one is prospecting for gold, one can either go at it alone or observe the activities of other prospectors. To the extent that these prospectors are rational and can form positive NPV expectations for future payoffs (i.e., gold discovery), by observing the prospecting efforts of others, one can learn something about the expectations of others. Of course, if the expectations of the prospectors are mediocre, observing their activities will not be informative. This is the basic premise underlying the theory of revealed preferences (Samuelson 1938) , in which the observed choices of agents are informative of their underlying utility maximization model. Prior research has applied this theory to the actions of skilled market participants to show that their actions are themselves informative about their underlying models of expected payoffs (e.g., Berk and van Binsbergen 2016) . We argue that, to the extent that information acquisition activities contain information about ex ante expected payoffs, they will be related to future realized payoffs (i.e., stock returns and fundamental performance).
All this said, it is important to recognize that information acquisition effort could also be motivated by expectations of negative future performance, which can be traded on by selling a current holding or by initiating a short position. On average, however, we conjecture that the information acquisition we observe is more likely to be motivated by expectations of positive performance than negative performance for two reasons. First, due to the additional costs and risks of short selling, it is much less common in the market than long positions. In fact, some financial institutions, such as pension funds and certain mutual funds, are entirely prohibited from taking short positions (Fabozzi 2004) . Second, while investors can potentially buy any of thousands of stocks in quantities of their choosing, they can only sell the stocks they currently own to the extent of their current holdings. Thus, there is an asymmetry in investors' ability to trade on ex ante expectations of future performance. Specifically, trading on expectations of negative news is more constrained than trading on expectations of positive news. Thus, we develop our hypotheses and our research design based on the positive expectations embedded in investors' information acquisition activities.
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Based on the above discussion, we formally state our first hypothesis, H1, as follows:
H1: Information acquisition is positively associated with future firm performance.
It is important to recognize that not all prospectors, including financial prospectors, are proficient at forming expectations about future payoffs. Differences in skill, resources, and information will create variation in prospector expectations-that is, some prospectors know where the fruitful opportunities are likely to be, while others do not. Applied to our setting, not all investor information acquisition activities will be informative because some investors are better (or worse) at forming expectations about future performance. This intuition suggests that some investors are better at prospecting than others, and thus, their information acquisition activities will be more directly tied to ex post payoffs.
There are both theoretical and practical reasons to expect that some investors' expectations are better than others and that their information gathering activities will be more predictive. First, prior theories of information acquisition generally require differential information among investors (e.g., Hellwig 1980; Grossman and Stiglitz 1980; Diamond and Verrecchia 1981; Odean 1998 ), which could manifest as different information endowments, differential abilities to acquire information or differential abilities to process it. The presence of information costs and/or investors without information processing skills is a necessary condition to incentivize information acquisition. In the presence of revealing prices, different expected payoffs to information acquisition must exist to incentivize some investors to undertake the effort.
Second, from a practical perspective, some investors have an informational advantage over others because of their time, expertise, and resources, which will in turn manifest in their revealed preferences for information. They have time and talent to undertake the effort and research to seek out more information where there are greater ex ante expectations for a future payoff. Other investors (e.g., retail traders) generally have less time, talent and resources to engage in information acquisition, and thus, their information acquisition activities will be less informative about future payoffs.
All of this discussion leads to our second hypothesis, H2, as follows:
H2: Sophisticated information acquisition is more positively associated with future firm performance than is unsophisticated information acquisition.
Data, variable measurement, sample composition and descriptive statistics

EDGAR IP address data
To measure information acquisition, we focus on users' acquisition of regulatory filings.
These filings are hosted by the SEC in an online repository called EDGAR, which hosts every financial filing issued by public companies for the past two decades. It represents a crucial source of a company's operational and financial information that is easy to acquire, externally audited, and rich with historical and forward-looking information. Because these data are both comprehensive and detailed, they represent an ideal place to examine investors' information acquisition choices and the information contained in those choices.
To measure users' information acquisition of SEC filings, we obtain the server logs for the EDGAR servers for the period 2003-2014. 6 This data set is described in detail in several recent studies, including Drake et al. (2015) and Lee, Ma, and Wang (2015) . These log files record each "click" when a user clicks on an internet link to a regulatory filing. In aggregate, the dataset represents several billion requests for public company information made by millions of unique users. Public companies are easily identified in the log files by their Central Identification Key (CIK). ESV (EDGAR Search Volume) captures the gross number of downloads per day t of SEC filings for a specific firm, j.
A key innovation of our paper is the ability to identify specific EDGAR users (e.g.,
Goldman Sachs), which we accomplish by classifying ESV into groups based on the IP address of the user downloading information from EDGAR. 7 Identifying the specific user who accesses the EDGAR database is complicated by the fact that the SEC partially anonymizes each IP address recorded in the server log. Hence, specific users (e.g., you) are unidentifiable, however, a range of users, such as an institution or a university, are much easier to identify based on their ownership of a range of IP addresses, which is public information. 8 For all unique IP addresses in the EDGAR log file with at least 100 requests during the entire sample period, we employ a "WhoIs" database acquired from the American Registry of Internet Numbers (https://www.arin.net/) to identify the organization to whom the IP address is registered. We then manually (i.e., by hand) classify the top 1,500 IP addresses, which represent 99% of all EDGAR downloads.
We separate ESV into two identifiable groups based on the IP owner organizations, which we call sophisticated ESV and retail ESV. The sophisticated investor group consists of all EDGAR search from identifiable investment banks, hedge funds, commercial banks, insurance companies, and other institutions deemed to be financial in nature. The retail investor group is comprised of EDGAR users that access the system via an identifiable internet service provider (ISP), such as Comcast or Time Warner. 9 We exclude IP addresses owned by parties that are likely to be accessing filings for purposes other than financial investment, including those from universities, audit firms, law firms, consulting firms, non-financial corporations, and government agencies.
The EDGAR log file data on the SEC website encrypts the last octet of the IP address such that the individual user cannot be specifically tracked. However, even without the final octet of the IP address, we found that the entire IP address range was owned by a single organization in the vast majority (>90%) of the cases. We use the owner of the majority of the IP address range for the remaining cases. Using this identification approach, we were able to identify and classify over 94% of the unique IP addresses (with at least 100 requests), which represent over 99% of the total EDGAR search volume during our sample period.
EDGAR search volume (ESV) variables
We now discuss the variables used in our empirical models (see Appendix B for a detailed definition of each variable and its applicable data source). Because the timing of the variable measurement is an important feature of our research design and varies across the different variables, in Figure 1 we provide a visual depiction of the variable measurement windows. Broadly speaking, we measure the information acquisition variables, ESV, in year t and all determinant variables and controls in year t-1 to ensure that the information in determinant and control variables is publicly available before the measurement window for the ESV variables. The future performance variables are all measured in year t+1.
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We employ several measures of information acquisition. First, we simply count the total amount of EDGAR searches for 10-K and 10-Q filings for a given firm on a given day.
Consistent with Drake et al (2015) , we label this variable EDGAR search volume, ESV. Note that ESV includes all search activity on EDGAR (including those where the IP addresses are not identifiable), whereas the measures below (Sophisticated ESV and Retail ESV) include only search activity for a subset of investors whose IP addresses can be confirmed. In addition and in contrast to prior research, we include all EDGAR searches, including suspected robot searches, in all our measures of ESV. 11 We include robots because some of the institutions we are interested in (e.g., hedge funds) have data algorithms whose actions to acquire information may be informative for future firm performance.
We then separate ESV by the type of user acquiring the information. Sophisticated information acquisition (Sophisticated ESVt) for the current fiscal year t is calculated as the natural log of one plus the count of EDGAR requests for periodic accounting reports (Forms 10-K and 10-Q) by institutional investors during the 12-month period that ends three months after the end of fiscal year t. The three-month lag allows time for the prior fiscal year's annual report to be filed before the ESV measurement window begins. Institutional investors are identified by IP addresses that are owned by top investment banks, hedge funds, commercial banks, insurance companies, and other financial institutions. The counterpart variable, retail investor information acquisition (Retail ESVt), is calculated as the natural log of one plus the count of periodic accounting report requests during the same one-year period by IP addresses owned by the most frequently used internet service providers (ISPs). In regressions, we employ the ranked quintiles (scaled to range between 0 and 1) of ESV to facilitate interpretation.
Future performance variables
Our primary analysis is the examination of the association between information acquisition for a given firm i's accounting information and its future abnormal returns and future fundamental performance (relating to H1 for all ESV and H2 for separating Sophisticated ESV from Retail ESV). We calculate future abnormal returns (Abn. Returnst+1) as the firm's annual buy-and-hold return less a characteristic-adjusted benchmark portfolio return, all measured in the 12-month period beginning three months after the end of the current fiscal year t. This timing ensures that there is no overlap with the measurement window for the ESV variables. The benchmark portfolio return is the buy-and-hold return for a characteristic portfolio based on size, book-to-market, and momentum (Daniel et al. 1997) .
We also examine a set of common fundamental performance metrics derived from the financial statements to test the predictive ability of investor information acquisition for future fundamentals. These metrics capture elements of performance, profitability, efficiency, and liquidity. We begin with the ratios included in the standard DuPont ROE framework: ROEt+1 is net income divided by average total shareholders' equity; Profit Margint+1 is net income divided by total sales; Asset Turnst+1 is total sales divided by average total assets; and Equity Multit+1 is average total assets divided by average total shareholders' equity. We also examine Operating Casht+1, which is net cash flow from operating activities divided by average total assets.
Control variables
We include a set of control variables that prior research finds to be associated with information acquisition via EDGAR (Drake et al. 2015) . Each of these control variables is also measured on a lagged basis in year t-1. Average turnover (Turnovert-1) is calculated as the monthly trading volume divided by the number of shares outstanding at the end of each month, all averaged over the 12 month period ending three months after the previous fiscal year end.
Prior year abnormal returns (Abn. Returnst-1) measured as the firm's annual buy-and-hold return less a benchmark portfolio return, all measured in the 12-month period ending three months after the end of the prior fiscal year t. Firm size (MVEt-1) is the natural log of the firm's market value of equity as of the end of the prior fiscal year. Analyst following (Analystst-1) is the natural log of the number of analysts in the consensus annual earnings forecast for the prior fiscal year.
Institutional ownership (InstOwnt-1) is the percentage of the total shares outstanding owned by institutional investors. BTMt-1 is the book-to-market ratio. Leveraget-1 is the ratio of total longterm debt to total assets. Finally, ShortInterestt-1 is the ratio of the firm's outstanding shares held in short interest to its total shares outstanding during the previous fiscal year.
Sample and descriptive statistics
The variables included in our empirical models require data from COMPUSTAT, CRSP, In terms of the future performance measures, average future abnormal returns are close to zero and median operating cash flows are 7% of average total assets. In terms of the ratios included in the DuPont framework, median return on equity is 8.0%, comprising a median profit margin of 4.5%, a median asset turnover of 76.1%, and an equity multiplier of 2.119. With respect to control variables, the sample firms have a mean market value of equity of $6.2 billion, have a median monthly turnover of 12.3%, are followed by roughly 1.5 analysts, are 56% owned by institutional investors, have a book-to-market ratio of 68%, have a leverage ratio of 42%, and short interest of 4.3%. We present pairwise correlations in Table 2 .
Is there information content in information acquisition?
ESV and future performance measures
Our first hypothesis relates to the association between information acquisition and future performance. We test this hypothesis using the following OLS model:
where future performance measures, Performancet+1, include one of the following six variables:
Abn. Returnst+1, Operating Casht+1, ROEt+1, Profit Margint+1, Asset Turnst+1, and Equity Multit+1.
H1 posits that µ1 > 0. The control variables, Controlst-1, are those described in Section 3.4 and are measured in year t-1 as defined in Appendix B. We also include the lagged performance measures, Performancet-k, in both years t and t-1 to control for the time series leading up to the future performance outcome variable. We include industry (Fama-French industry classification 48), µIndust, and year fixed effects, µYear, to control for cross-sectional differences in information acquisition and we cluster standard errors by firm to account for residual serial correlation.
In Table 3 , we present our estimation results for estimating model (1). In three of the six regressions, the coefficient on ESVt (Quintile Rank) is positive and significant, which suggests that investors' information acquisition activities are often predictive of strong future performance. In Column (1) where Abn. Returnst+1 is the dependent variable, we find a strong positive association between ESVt (Quintile Rank) and future abnormal returns that is statistically significant at the p < 0.01 level. The magnitude of the coefficient on ESVt (Quintile Rank) implies that the future abnormal return is 4.5% higher for the highest quintile of ESV compared to the lowest quintile. We also find some evidence that ranked ESV is predictive of future ROE and asset turnover although statistical significance is lower (p < 0.10 for both variables). We do not find that ranked ESV is predictive, on average, of operating cash flows, profit margins or the equity multiplier. These results suggest that costly information acquisition is positively associated with future returns, or in other words, investors' expectations about future payoffs are subsequently realized. 
Retail vs. sophisticated ESV and future performance measures
Our second hypothesis addresses whether the predictive ability of accounting information acquisition for future performance is different for sophisticated versus retail EDGAR users. We test this hypothesis using the following OLS models:
In equations (2) and (3), we employ the quintile ranks for Retail ESV and Sophisticated ESV, respectively. Everything else is the same as in equation (1). Table 4 presents the results of estimating equation (2). The results are quite different from those presented Table 3 , in which ESV generally predicted future performance. In Table 4 , Retail ESV positively predicts only one of the measures of future performance, asset turnover.
However, it also negatively predicts future ROE, consistent with the actions of retail investors generating a negative spread on future profits. At least for ROE, retail investors are targeting precisely the wrong companies for information acquisition. For all other measures of future performance, Retail ESV is not a significant predictor. Overall these results suggest that retail investors' actions to acquire information are not very informative.
12 Equity markets experienced rather dramatic swings during our sample period, which likely do not reflect corresponding swings in fundamental performance of the firms. Untabulated analyses reveal that the hedge portfolio returns are very period specific (i.e., they are clustered in time) and range from -3.9% in 2007 to 21.2% in 2008. This coefficient is telling when visually compared to the ESV coefficient in Table 3 (for all EDGAR users, the coefficient in 0.045), suggesting that the actions of sophisticated users to acquire EDGAR information are just about twice as informative for future returns than are the average EDGAR users' actions.
In addition to abnormal future returns in Column (1), we examine measures of future fundamental performance in the other columns of Table 5 . We find that Sophisticated ESV is a significant predictor of future operating cash flows, which is statistically significant at the one percent level. In terms of the DuPont framework dependent variables, we find that Sophisticated ESV is a significant predictor of positive ROEt+1 in Column (3), which is primarily due to its relation with the profitability component, Profit Margint+1 in Column (4). In both of these regressions, ranked Sophisticated ESV is positive and statistically significant at the p < 0.10 level. However, we do not find a significant association with the operating performance component, Asset Turnst+1, in Column (4) or with the equity multiplier (Equity Multit+1), in Column (5) which is the component of the DuPont ROE framework associated with financial leverage.
The results related to future fundamental performance provide evidence in support of H2.
The magnitudes of the coefficients provide evidence for the economic significance of the associations. For example, the results in Column (3) suggest that the future ROE for firms that receive the highest level of abnormal information acquisition from sophisticated investors is 3%
higher than the future ROE for firms that receive the lowest level of abnormal information acquisition from sophisticated investors. This spread in performance for high versus low abnormal sophisticated information acquisition is 3.5% for profit margin and 80 basis points for net operating cash flows. Each of these results suggests that there is information about future fundamental performance in the information acquisition activities of sophisticated investors.
In summary, the results presented in Tables 4 and 5 suggest that sophisticated investors allocate information acquisition activities to firms with positive expected future returns and strong expected fundamental performance, and that these firms outperform those targeted by the information acquisition efforts of less sophisticated investors.
How do sophisticated investors gain an informational advantage?
The results discussed in Section 4 show that the revealed preferences of sophisticated investors (i.e., successful prospectors) contain information about the cross-section of future performance. In this section, we explore where these investor-prospectors choose to prospect in order to better understand how they achieve their informational advantage. We conjecture that the informational advantage of institutional investors arises because of their ability to process challenging information signals. That is, they are able to prospect where less sophisticated investors are not because of their skills, expertise and resources. Accordingly, we explore whether institutional investors will be more likely to target their information collection efforts towards firms with information environments that are more difficult to understand (and the flip side -whether they will be less likely to target familiar firms with easier to understand information environments), but where the expected payoffs to such efforts are also higher.
Accordingly, we develop proxies for firm characteristics associated with informational processing costs and firm familiarity, and measure these proxies in the prior fiscal year, t-1.
These variables are lagged to ensure that the information contained in the variables is available to investors at the start of fiscal year t when we capture the investors' information gathering activities (ESV).
We proxy for informational processing costs using measures of extreme fundamentals including accruals (Sloan, 1996) , the book-to-market ratio (Rosenberg et al. 1985) , firm size as measured by its market capitalization (Banz 1981) , unexpected earnings (Rendleman et al. 1982) , and the operating cash flow-to-price ratio (Chandrashekar and Rao 2009) . We rank each of these fundamental signals into deciles and construct the variable based on how extreme the fundamental signal is in the distribution and on whether the signal implies that the investor should take a long versus a short position in the stock. For each fundamental signal, we assign an indicator variable set equal to one in any year where the firm falls into the most extreme decile that implies a long position -the highest decile for book-to-market, unexpected earnings, and cash flow-to-price and the lowest decile for accruals and firm size. We similarly construct a short-oriented indicator for each of the fundamental signals in the extreme deciles implying a short position should be taken -the lowest decile for book-to-market, unexpected earnings, and cash flow-to-price and the highest decile for accruals and firm size. Information processing will also be difficult for hard-to-value stocks, as captured by asset intangibility, return volatility and loss-years. Intangiblest-1, is the amount of intangible assets divided by total assets (Barth et al. 2001; Gu and Wang 2005; Lehavy et al. 2011) . Return volatility (Volatilityt-1) is the standard deviation of monthly returns over the 12-month period ending three months after the fiscal year end (Jiang et al. 2005; Zhang 2006; Kumar 2009 ). Losst-1 is an indicator for firm-years where net income is less than zero (Hayn 1995; Joos and Plesko 2005) .
We also explore whether sophisticated investors will be less likely to acquire information signals that are related to firm familiarity (i.e., prospectors like to mine alone), which we capture using three proxies. The first is an indicator for whether the firm is included in the S&P 500 (SP500t-1), which is one of the most prominent and visible stock market indices (Chen, Noronha, and Singal 2004; Guo, Finke, and Mulholland 2015) . The second proxy measures how much the company advertises its products or services, which should be positively correlated with familiarity (Grullon, Kanatas, and Weston 2004; Gurun and Butler 2012) ; Advertisingt-1 is calculated as annual advertising expense scaled by sales. The third proxy is taken from Chakravarthy et al. (2014) and relates to firms that are more likely to be visible in the community because they provide retail products and services directly to consumers. The variable Retailt-1 is an indicator variable set equal to one for firms in the following Fama-French 48 industries: 1-3, 7, 9, 11, 13, 18, 23, 27-30, 32-35, and 41-46 The vector of controls, Controls, is the same as those described in model (1). All variables are also described in Appendix B. Consistent with model (1), we include industry and year fixed effects, and we cluster standard errors by firm. We predict that sophisticated investors garner an informational advantage using superior processing skills of challenging information signals and by shunning information acquisition of highly familiar firms. Thus, in estimations of model (4), we expect β1 > 0 (for the long leg of extreme fundamentals), β1 < 0 (for the short leg), β2 > 0, and β3 < 0.
In Table 6 , Panel A, we present descriptive statistics for the new determinants variables used to proxy for extreme fundamentals, hard-to-value and familiarity. We find that median accruals are -4.3% of total assets and median cash flow-to-market is 8.0% of market value. We also find that median SUE is approximately zero. Descriptive statistics for MVE and BTM are presented in Table 1 . Intangibles represent 5.4% of total assets for the median firm. Median return volatility is 10.3% and about 26% of our sample firms are in a loss position. We also find that approximately 14% of the firms are included in the S&P 500. Advertising expense averages 1% of total sales. About 62% of the firms are in industries that provide retail goods and services directly to consumers.
In Table 6 , Panel B we present the regression results for estimating model (4). We find evidence that sophisticated investors are more likely to target firms with signals of greater processing costs. The coefficients on four of the five proxies for the long leg of extreme fundamentals are positive and significant. We further find that all three measures of hard-tovalue stocks, Intangibles, Volatility, and Loss, are positively associated with Sophisticated ESV, consistent with the notion that sophisticated investors create an informational advantage by learning from signals that others might find more challenging to interpret. Finally, we find some evidence that sophisticated investors reduce information acquisition activities for familiar firms,
as Advertising is negatively associated with Sophisticated ESV.
On the whole, the results presented in Table 6 provide evidence that institutional investors are more likely to gather information for firms where information processing costs are expected to be the highest.
Summary and caveats
In this study, we examine investors' choices to acquire costly information and whether these choices contain information that is useful for predicting future firm performance.
Specifically, we use the revealed preferences of EDGAR users' acquisition of accounting information to reverse engineer their expectations about future fundamental performance. We find the information acquisition contains information, in that it is predictive of future abnormal returns and fundamentals. Further, we find that the information acquisition activities of institutional investors are highly predictive of future performance, while those of noninstitutional investors are not.
We also provide evidence on the types of firms that are the target of information acquisition efforts by sophisticated investors in order to shed light on the source of their apparent informational advantage. We find that information acquisition by institutional investors is more targeted at firms where information processing costs are high (specifically, firms with extreme fundamentals and with greater valuation uncertainty), but less targeted towards familiar, highly visible firms.
These findings are subject to some caveats. First, we cannot observe the factors that caused the investor to seek out EDGAR data in the first place, nor what other information sources, such as Capital IQ or FactSet, complement the EDGAR data. Second, we cannot observe what investors do with the EDGAR information. An implication of this shortcoming is that we cannot tie their subsequent actions (e.g., buy, sell, hold, short) to the firms on which they acquired the EDGAR information and thus, the results on the predictable returns are necessarily indirect. However, it is important to note that we are more interested in examining the information in investors' actions to acquire information than what is contained in the information-our results suggest that their actions are predictive of future returns and fundamental performance, holding constant informational attributes related to information acquisition. Third, our IP address data are not comprehensive, such that we cannot observe the information acquisition of all sophisticated investors or retail investors-just for those whose IP addresses are identifiable.
Notwithstanding these caveats, our findings contribute to the budding literature which empirically measures information acquisition. Our evidence suggests that information acquisition itself is predictive of future returns and fundamentals. In addition, we shed some light on the information gathering activities of institutional and retail investors and how these activities differ in their predictive ability for future performance. By examining the information signals that sophisticated investors seek out, we gain insight into how they gain an informational advantage.
We are encouraged by multiple potential applications for these data to be used in future research. For example, a concurrent study examines the profitability of a trading strategy based on the number of unique EDGAR users (Li and Sun 2017) . Using a two-year panel data, they find that a portfolio that goes long in firms with high numbers of unique EDGAR users and short in firms with low numbers of unique EDGAR users generates an abnormal monthly return of 80 basis points during this time period. 13 In addition, other research specifically targets the information acquisition activities of other EDGAR user groups, including regulators (SticeLawrence 2017), the IRS (Bozanic et al. 2017) , the Federal Reserve , auditors (Drake et al. 2017 ) and other sophisticated investors (Johnson 2015) . We look forward to and encourage additional research in this area to help us better understand how investor information acquisition impacts markets.
Appendix B -Variable Definitions Variable Description Source
Abn. Returnst+1
The benchmark portfolio-adjusted returns for the 12 month period beginning three months after the fiscal year end calculated as the actual buy-and-hold return less the buyand-hold portfolio return for a benchmark characteristic portfolio based on size, book-tomarket, and momentum.
CRSP
Advertisingt-1
The prior year advertising expense divided by total sales. Compustat
Analystst-1
The natural log of the number of analysts in the consensus annual earnings forecast for the prior fiscal year. I/B/E/S
Asset Turnst+1
Asset turnover calculated as the one-year ahead sales divided by average total assets. Compustat
BTMt-1
The book-to-market ratio. Compustat
Equity Multit+1
Equity multiplier calculated as average total assets divided by average total shareholders' equity. Compustat
ESVt
EDGAR search volume by all EDGAR users calculated as the natural log of one plus the total count of EDGAR requests for periodic accounting reports (Forms 10-K and 10-Q) during the 12-month period ending three months after the current fiscal year end. ESVt (Quintile Rank) is the quintile ranking of ESVt scaled to range between 0 and 1.
SEC EDGAR
InstOwnt-1
Institutional ownership calculated as the percentage of total shares outstanding owned by institutional investors as of the end of the prior fiscal year.
Thomson/ CRSP
Intangiblest-1
Intangible assets scaled by total assets. Compustat
Leveraget-1
The ratio of total long-term debt to total assets as of the end of the prior fiscal year.
An indicator variable for firms with negative net income in the prior fiscal year.
The natural log of the firm's market value of equity as of the end of the prior fiscal year.
Compustat Operating Casht+1
The one-year ahead net cash flows from operations scaled by average total assets.
Compustat Profit Margint+1
The one-year ahead net income divided by total sales. Compustat
Retailt-1
An indicator variable for firms within industries that provide goods and services directly to consumers 7, 9, 11, 13, 18, 23, (27) (28) (29) (30) (32) (33) (34) (35) (41) (42) (43) (44) (45) (46) .
CRSP
Retail ESVt
EDGAR search volume by non-institutional investors calculated as the natural log of one plus the count of EDGAR requests for periodic accounting reports (Forms 10-K and 10-Q) during the 12-month period ending three months after the current fiscal year end by IP addresses coming from an internet service provider (ISP). Retail ESVt (Quintile Rank) is the quintile ranking of Retail ESVt divided by 4.
SEC EDGAR/ ARIN
ROEt+1
The one-year ahead net income divided by average total shareholders' equity. Compustat
ShortInterestt-1
The ratio of the firm's outstanding shares held in short interest to its total shares outstanding during the prior fiscal year. Compustat
Sophisticated ESVt
EDGAR search volume by institutional investors calculated as the natural log of one plus the count of EDGAR requests for periodic accounting reports (Forms 10-K and 10-Q) during the 12-month period ending three months after the current fiscal year end by the following five categories of IP address owner organizations: the top 10 full-service investment banks, the top 100 hedge funds, commercial banks, insurance companies, and other financial institutions. Sophisticated ESVt (Quintile Rank) is the quintile ranking of Sophisticated ESVt divided by 4.
SEC EDGAR/ ARIN
SP500t-1
An indicator variable for listing on the S&P 500 index. CRSP
Turnovert-1
Average monthly turnover calculated as the monthly trading volume divided by the number of shares outstanding at the end of the month averaged over the 12 month period ending three months after the prior fiscal year end.
CRSP
Volatilityt-1
Return volatility calculated as the standard deviation of monthly returns over the 12 month period ending three months after the prior fiscal year end. CRSP
FIGURE 1 Hypothetical Timeline
Fiscal end year t-1 December 31, 2010 Fiscal end year t December 31, 2011 Fiscal end year t+1 December 31, 2012 10-K filing date March 15, 2011 10-K filing date March 13, 2012 10-K filing date (1) is future abnormal returns. Column (2) presents the results for future operating cash flows and Columns (3) through (6) present the future performance dependent variables relating to the DuPont ROE Framework. All variables are as defined in Appendix B. The model includes contemporaneous and lagged measures of the dependent variables as indicated (coefficients untabulated for parsimony). Fixed effects as indicated are included but untabulated. Standard errors based on firm-clustering are included in parentheses below the coefficients. 
